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MUNICIPAL FAULT BEFORE MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY: KIBBE v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD,
777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985)
The Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 now codified in Title 42, section 1983
of the United States Code,2 provides broad remedies3 for persons de-
1. Congress originally enacted § 1983 as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
Although its major purpose was to remedy post-Civil War racial violence in the South,
§ 1983 is now a predominant civil means to remedy violations of all constitutional
rights. Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act provides in part:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any
such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the con-
trary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in
the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases
in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hun-
dred and sixty-six, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication."
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 14, 14 Stat. 27.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
For an overview of § 1983 and its prima facie case, see Mahoney, The Prima Facie
Section 1983 Case, 14 URB. LAW. 131 (1982).
3. Section 1983 creates no substantive rights. It merely provides remedies for depri-
vations of statutory or constitutional rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(section 1983 establishes nominal and compensatory damages for victims deprived of
constitutional rights). See generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5
(1980) (a comprehensive discussion of damage remedies for § 1983 violations). See also
Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981), which provides: "In any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title ... , the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
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prived of their constitutional rights "under color of state law."4 Section
1983 is a primary statutory basis for federal actions5 by individuals
seeking to remedy municipal police misconduct.' In Kibbe v. City of
Springfield7 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that a jury may find a police department violates the Constitution 8
if it is grossly negligent by failing to train adequately its officers.9
In Kibbe,1" the Springfield Police Department received a report of a
criminal incident in progress.1 Upon arriving at the scene, police of-
ficers found that Clinton Thurston had abducted Pamela Etter. 2 A
high speed chase ensued between several police officers and the sus-
pect.1" During the chase two officers set up road blocks that Thurston
avoided. 4 As Thurston passed the first barrier, one officer fired at the
car." When a second barrier failed to stop him, 6 a motorcycle officer
4. To bring a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of
federal rights occurring "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See generally Lugar v. Emondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982) (describing the contours of "under color of state law"). See also Mahoney,
supra note 2, at 135.
5. Between 1871 and 1921 only 21 cases were brought under § 1983. In contrast,
plaintiffs filed 15,419 cases in 1981 alone. For an analysis of recent § 1983 caseloads
and § 1983 litigation, see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 522-56 (1982); see generally Whitman, supra note 3,
at 26.
6. Police misconduct denotes behavior by municipal police officers that violates fed-
eral constitutional or statutory rights. See generally M. AVERY & D. RUDOVSKY, PO-
LICE MISCONDUCT: LAw AND LITIGATION (2d ed. 1987).
7. 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985).
8. Id. at 809.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 802. Clinton Thurston, the suspect, threatened the occupants of an apart-
ment with a knife. Other calls reported that Thurston violated a restraining order and
broke down a door. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Before the actual chase began, an unmarked policeman attempted to stop
Thurston by flashing his headlights, turning on his portable blue light, and activating
his siren. When the police officer walked up to the driver's window, Thurston drove off.
Id.
14. Id. One of the police officers claimed that Thurston accelerated when approach-
ing the roadblock and narrowly missed an officer. Id.
15. Id. at 802. After Thurston drove by, the police officer reported that the suspect
attempted to run over another police officer. The dispatcher then broadcasted, "This is
not only a violation of a restraining order, it's assault by means of a vehicle." Id.
According to the department's rules and regulations, the police department allows
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joined the pursuit. 7 Three times Thurston swerved to hit the officer,18
who then fired two shots at Thurston, the second hitting the suspect in
the head.' 9 Thurston's car collided with another vehicle and rolled to
a stop.2" Not realizing the bullet had hit Thurston, the officer ordered
the suspect out of the car." When Thurston failed to do so, the officer
struck him on the head, pulled him from the auto,22 and handcuffed
him. The officer took Thurston to the hospital, where he later died.23
Following the shooting, the administratrix24 of Thurston's estate
filed suit under section 1983 alleging that the City of Springfield25 had
deprived Thurston of his civil rights. She claimed that the City's inad-
equate police training deprived Thurston of his life without due process
of the law.26 The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded monetary
damages against the City.27 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed.
28
The Supreme Court first applied section 198329 to redress unconsti-
the use of deadly force to effect an arrest when certain circumstances exist, including an
officer's reasonable belief that the crime in question includes the use or threatened use of
deadly force. Id.
16. Id. The second roadblock consisted of a police vehicle across the right hand
lane and a police officer in the middle of the other lanes attempting to flag down Thur-
ston's car. Id.
17. Id. at 803.
18. Id.
19. Id. The first shot apparently hit a nearby house. In addition, the police officer
failed to notify his supervisor of the shots. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The officer used his flashlight as a weapon to hit the suspect. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 801. The administratrix, Lois Thurston Kibbe, was the appellee. Id.
25. Id. Kibbe also named several police officers in the action. The appellants were
the City of Springfield and the police officers. Id.
26. Id. at 801-02. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which provides in part: "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law .... "
27. 777 F.2d at 802. More specifically, the jury returned verdicts against the police
officer who fired the fatal shot and against the City. The jury awarded one dollar in
compensatory damages, five hundred dollars in punitive damages against the officer,
and compensatory damages in the amount of fifty thousand dollars against the City. Id.
28. Id. at 810.
29. To recover in any § 1983 violation, including municipal liability cases, plaintiffs
must allege and prove two essential elements. First, the plaintiff must show that the
1989]
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tutional acts committed by police officers in Monroe v. Pape.3" Monroe
arose from an incident involving thirteen Chicago police officers 3' who
unlawfully searched and ransacked the plaintiffs' home,3" detained the
father at a police station without an opportunity to consult an attor-
ney,33 and ultimately released him without pressing charges.34 Plain-
tiffs sued the City of Chicago, claiming a violation of their
constitutional rights.3" The court held that while Congress intended
section 1983 to remedy violations of constitutional rights committed by
police officers, municipalities were not "persons" within the meaning of
the statute.36 Although Monroe advanced the cause of personal liberty,
its rejection of municipal liability has weakened the statute's remedial
function.
37
conduct occurred under the color of state law. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 992 (1982). Second, plaintiffs must show that this conduct deprived plaintiffs of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution under federal
law. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
In municipal liability cases, two additional elements are required. First, plaintiffs
must show that the challenged act occurred under a governmental "custom or usage."
Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the custom or usage proximately caused the
deprivation. See infra note 52 and accompanying text for discussion of proximate
cause.
30. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31. Id. at 169.
32. Id. The police officers broke into the plaintiffs' home without a warrant in the
middle of the night and made them stand naked while the officers pillaged every room.
They emptied drawers and ripped clothing. The officers then took Mr. Monroe to the
police station where he stood waiting for ten hours. The officers did not allow him to
call an attorney or his family.
33. Id.
34. Id. Petitioners were six black children and their parents. Id. at 167.
35. Id. at 169. Petitioners claimed a deprivation of their guaranty against unreason-
able searches and seizures, contained in the fourteenth amendment and made applicable
to states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 191 n.50. After an extensive investigation of the statute's legislative his-
tory, the Monroe Court found that Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment
indicated its intent to exclude municipalities from the meaning of persons as used in
§ 1983. Congress believed that this amendment would unconstitutionally impose civil
liability upon county and town organizations. Id. at 190. For the text of the Sherman
Amendment and a discussion of its congressional debate, see generally Mead, 42 U.S. C.
Section 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65
N.C.L. RFv. 517, 525 n.53 (1987).
37. Monroe dealt with two issues that ultimately advanced the protection of consti-
tutional rights: whether the invasion of the Monroe home constituted a deprivation of
the Monroes' rights secured by the Constitution within the meaning of § 1983, and
whether Congress intended to give a remedy under § 1983 to parties deprived of consti-
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Seventeen years later the Supreme Court reversed its position on the
municipal liability issue in Monell v. Department of Social Services.3 8
The Court held that a municipality could be liable for damages in-
flicted pursuant to official governmental policy or custom. 9 In Monell,
female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board
of Education for the City of New York alleged that the agencies uncon-
stitutionally maintained an official policy' that compelled a pregnant
employee to take unpaid leave before it was medically necessary.4 1 In
overruling Monroe, the Court concluded that Congress intended sec-
tion 1983 to include municipalities as persons4 2 and that municipal lia-
bility existed for such actions.
4 3
The Monell Court also defined the contours of municipal liability
under section 1983." Expressly rejecting the theory of respondeat su-
perior,45 the Court held that a municipality could be liable only for acts
tutional rights by an official's abuse of position. 365 U.S. at 171-72, 187. The Monroe
Court answered both issues affirmatively, and its ruling is still good law. The Court's
rejection of municipal liability because a municipality is not a "person" under § 1983
seriously impaired the full development of § 1983. For criticism of the Monroe holding,
see Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under 42 U.S.C Section 1983 Af-
ter City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 151 (1986); See also Comment, Munic-
ipal Liability for Constitutional Violations: Can You Fight City Hall? A Survey of the
Circuits, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 373 (1978) (also discussing other methods and theories of
maintaining a cause of action against a municipality under federal statutory and consti-
tutional authority).
38. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
39. Id. at 690-91.
40. Id. at 660-61.
41. Id. The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for periods of unlawful forced
leave.
42. Id. at 665. The Court undertook a fresh analysis of the legislative history lead-
ing to the passage of the Civil Rights Act. In particular, the Court focused on Con-
gress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment. See supra note 36. Writing for the seven-
member majority, Justice Brennan decided that Congress did not intend a municipality
to be immune from "its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 683. See
generally Mead, supra note 36.
43. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
44. Id. at 691.
45. Id. The majority felt that Congress did not intend to hold municipalities liable
unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitu-
tional tort. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a municipality cannot be liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor. For a discussion on vicarious liability and respondeat
superior, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th
ed. 1984). See also C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 251 (2d ed. 1980) (defining respon-
deat superior as a theory that holds a master responsible for his servant's torts commit-
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committed pursuant to a governmental custom or policy.46 The
Supreme Court defined custom to include any act promulgated by mu-
nicipal employees and sanctioned by policymakers. 47
In order to satisfy the Monell Court's policy or custom requirement,
plaintiffs generally allege that the municipality's policy or custom of
training or supervising its police officers is inadequate.4 ' The Supreme
Court first faced the inadequate training theory in City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle.49 In Tuttle, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's
50
holding that a single, isolated incident of unusually excessive force is
insufficient to impose section 1983 liability upon a municipality for its
ted while acting within the scope of his employment even when the master has used due
care in the selection, instruction, and supervision of the servant).
46. Id. at 690-91. The court used Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970), to establish its rationale that a custom could lead to a constitutional deprivation.
See also Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Cus-
tom," 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1979) (describing the transition from Monroe to Monell
and the Court's justification for such a drastic change and dramatic expansion of civil
rights enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
47. Id. A number of lower courts have interpreted the Monell "custom" definition
differently. See generally Bennet v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1016 (1986); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1983); Turpin v.
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. See, eg., Votour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (lst Cir. 1985) (misconduct attributed
to inadequate training); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983) (failure to
properly train officers in weapons use); Languirond v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.
1983) (alleged inadequacy in use of firearm); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.
1982). See also Penland & Boardman, Section 1983-Contemporary Trends in the Police
Misconduct Arena, 20 IDAHo L. REv 661 (1984); Comment, MunicipalLiability Under
Section 1983:.Rethinking the "Policy or Custom" Standard After City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 71 IowA L. REv. 1209 (1986).
49. 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In Tuttle, a police officer from Oklahoma City, while re-
sponding to an all-points bulletin concerning a robbery in progress, shot and killed Mrs.
Tuttle's husband. Id. at 811. Mrs. Tuttle alleged that the actions of both the officer and
the city deprived her husband of his constitutional rights. Id. at 811. She further al-
leged that the city's inadequate training policies caused her husband's death. Id. She
attempted to prove her theory in two ways. First, she alleged that the circumstances
surrounding the shooting conflicted with accepted police practices. Id. at 826. Second,
she attempted to establish an inadequate training policy through the testimony of an
expert on police training procedures. Id.
50. The Tenth Circuit held that the shooting was so plainly and grossly negligent
that it strongly showed a lack of adequate training. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
728 F.2d 456, 461 (1984).
In the Supreme Court, however, both the plurality consisting of Rehnquist, Burger,
White, and O'Connor, and the concurrence composed of Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackman, agreed that evidence of a single incident is insufficient to support an infer-
ence of inadequate municipal training policies. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
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inadequate training policy.5 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
city, as opposed to a nonpolicymaking municipal employee, is responsi-
ble for the constitutional violation.52 As a result of Tuttle, a section
1983 plaintiff bears a heavier burden of pleading and proving the inade-
quacy of the police training curriculum.53
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the policy or custom caused
the constitutional violation.54 In Rizzo v. Goode,55 the Supreme Court
held that a police officer's misconduct must be both causally linked to
the constitutional deprivation 56 and the result of a municipal proce-
dure.57 The Supreme Court's requirement of this additional element in
municipal liability cases forces an injured party to prove that the policy
or custom was the cause-in-fact 58 and the proximate cause 9 of the
injury.'
51. The Court indicated that while general liability could be imposed for a single
incident, it was insufficient to establish municipal liability. The Court did state that in
all cases considerably more proof is necessary to establish the requisite fault of the mu-
nicipality. 471 U.S. at 811.
For discussion of Tuttle and its subsequent effects on the theory of municipal liability,
see generally, Comment, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: Causation in Municipal Lia-
bility Cases Under Section 1983, 11 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 207 (1986); Comment, Mu-
nicipal Liability After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: A Single Incident of Police
Misconduct May Establish Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C Section 1983 When
Based on Inadequate Training or Supervision, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 551 (1986) [here-
inafter Municipal Liability After Tuttle].
52. This qualification on municipal liability effectively raises the burden of proof.
Plaintiff must now show a causal connection between the policy and the constitutional
deprivation. 471 U.S. at 823. In formulating this standard, the Court required that the
plaintiff show at least an affirmative link between the policy and the violation. Id. See
generally Votour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (Ist Cir. 1985); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668
F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1983). See also
C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 174 (2d ed. 1980) (defining proximate cause as those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the
law is justified in imposing liability).
53. 471 U.S. at 822-24.
54, A plaintiff can establish the existence of a policy or custom by using the Tuttle
technique and alleging that the municipality's policy or custom of training or supervis-
ing its police officers is inadequate. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808
(1985).
55. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
56. Id. at 375.
57. Id.
58. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, at 265. (the "but for"
test and the "substantial factor" test establish cause-in-fact).
59. See C. MORRIS, supra note 52, at 174.
60. Courts have recently sought to clarify further municipal liability analysis. See
1989]
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Recently, in the City of Springfield v. Kibbe,61 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the controversial issue of municipal liabil-
ity for inadequate training of employees62 and to decide whether this
liability is consistent with Monell.6" The majority did not decide the
case on the merits," however, because it felt the case was an inappro-
priate vehicle for resolving the inadequate training issue.65 The major-
ity66 refused to decide questions not raised or litigated in the lower
court,67 especially where the petitioner failed to object to a jury in-
struction.6' By deciding Kibbe solely on procedural grounds, the
Supreme Court has effectively left any decision on the substantive is-
sues to the appellate courts.69
The dissent7° believed the case warranted a decision on the merits.71
Disagreeing with the court of appeals, the dissent contended that the
Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (establishing the right of qualified
immunity for municipalities on certain occasions); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (courts should not assess punitive damages against
municipalities).
61. 480 U.S. 257 (1987). Because the Supreme Court dismissed the case on proce-
dural grounds instead of addressing the merits, the substantive issues remain undecided.
The First Circuit is the highest court to discuss the substantive issues, and therefore, the
author chooses to comment on this decision, not the procedural decision of the Supreme
Court.
62. Id. The Court also considered whether more than "negligence" in training is
required to establish municipal liability.
63. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipality liable for damages inflicted pursuant to offi-
cial governmental policy or custom).
64. The Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds. 480 U.S. at 258-60.
65. Id.
66. The majority's opinion was a per curiam decision. Id. at 258.
67. Id The Court based its decision on California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 556 n.2
(1957), which gave the Supreme Court the power to dismiss a case because the issue was
not raised or litigated in the lower court. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 51, which provides
that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving... [of] an instruction unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict." Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra note 71 listing the two substantive issues in Kibbe.
70. Justice O'Connor wrote the dissent, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Powell joined. 480 U.S. at 260-72.
71. The dissent would have granted certiorari to determine whether a city can be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing inadequate police training, and if so,
what standard should govern the imposition of such liability. 480 U.S. at 260. Because
the court of appeals had expressly ruled on the negligence issue, the dissent could find
no jurisdictional or prudential reason why the Court should not review the decision on
the merits. Id. at 263-64.
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element of causation was necessary to a finding of municipal liability.72
Without proximate causation between the custom or policy of inade-
quate training and the alleged constitutional violation, the dissent
would not hold the municipality liable for the negligent acts of its
employees.73
In Kibbe v. City of Springfield 7 the First Circuit reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that section 1983 liability arises from injuries inflicted by govern-
ment policy or custom. 75 With this in mind, the First Circuit affirmed
the trial court's decision, thus distinguishing Kibbe from Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle.76 In Tuttle, the Supreme Court held that a single inci-
dent of police misconduct by itself does not permit an inference of in-
adequate police training."
The court of appeals distinguished these cases in two respects. First,
the court reasoned that unlike the defective jury instruction in Tuttle,7 s
the Kibbe instruction expressly informed the jury that they could not
find the city liable solely on evidence of a single incident of police mis-
conduct. 79 The court then found that while sparse evidence regarding
the Springfield Police Department's training policy existed in the rec-
ord,8 o the jury could have reasonably concluded from testimony,"l
facts,8 2 and assumptions 3 that the training was grossly inadequate.8 4
The court drew a second distinction between Kibbe and Tuttle 5 in
72. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
73. See supra note 52 for discussion of proximate cause.
74. 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985).
75. Id. at 803. The court also alfirmed that § 1983 may not be imposed on a basis of
vicarious liability. Id. See also supra note 45.
76. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
77. Id. at 815.
78. Id. at 811-15. The judge instructed the jury that if they found the incident of
police misbehavior so outrageously out of accord with accepted police practices, they
could infer from those actions that the city's policies or customs caused the injury. Id.
79. 777 F.2d at 809-10.
80. Id. at 807.
81. Id. Testimony from two officers indicated that the department gave no gui-
dance in apprehending suspects fleeing in motor vehicles. Id.
82. Id. at 804. In reviewing the case, the court admitted that the facts were close
and thus refutable. Id.
83. Id. at 807. The court lists a chain of inferences that the jury could have made in
determining the training program was inadequate. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 806. See also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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its definition of a "single incident." The court claimed that the Tuttle
circumstances involved a single officer and a single act of misconduct.86
The Kibbe situation, however, involved ten police officers and many
different acts of alleged misconduct.8 7 The court distinguished the sin-
gle incident in Tuttle from the supposed single incident in Kibbe,88 stat-
ing that there is stronger evidence of municipal fault when incidents
involve many acts of police misconduct, even if the acts occur during
one episode.89 Therefore Kibbe met the Tuttle standard, which re-
quires considerably more proof to meet the requisite causation. 90
The Kibbe court next addressed whether the jury could properly find
that the training program proximately caused Thurston's death. 91 The
court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the city's
training policy caused the constitutional deprivation. 92 Once again the
court used inferences and assumptions to support its conclusion.93 By
analyzing the particular events of the evening and concluding that a
reasonable jury could find a nexus between the training program and
the resulting injury, the court found the city liable.94
A narrow reading of Kibbe leaves a bold mark on municipal liability
cases involving police misconduct under section 1983. The court's
analysis and rationale are tenuous and deficient at best.
Although the First Circuit legitimately distinguished Tuttle and
Kibbe,95 it failed to establish fully a case of liability against the city.
Courts have repeatedly stressed the need to find a direct, causal con-
nection between municipal conduct and constitutional deprivation.96
86. Id. at 805. The court called this situation a "true single incident," meaning that
the misconduct only involved one officer and one wrongdoing. Id.
87. Id. at 805-06.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. See supra note 50 (in order to hold a municipality liable the plaintiff must have
more proof than just the single incident of misconduct); see generally Municipal Liabil-
ity After Tuttle, supra note 51.
91. 777 F.2d at 806. See supra note 52 for a definition of proximate cause and its
relation to legal liability.
92. Id. at 807. The court used the word "sparse" to describe the evidence support-
ing municipal liability. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 808.
95. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
96. See Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal
liability under § 1983 can be imposed only where the municipality itself causes the vio-
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In this case, the causal connection between the municipal policy and
the constitutional violation is inherently tenuous. The court neglected
to consider that a number of other causal factors operated at the time
of the officer's alleged misconduct.97 These factors may have played a
predominant part in bringing about the constitutional violation.9" For
instance, the disposition of the individual officers, the extent of their
experience with similar circumstances, and the actions of other police
officers involved may have contributed to Thurston's death.99
By imputing section 1983 liability to the municipality based on spec-
ulation and conjecture, the court does not establish that the training
program causedoo the misconduct. The court's inferences directly
conflict with the Tuttle standard, which requires more than a single
incident to establish the requisite fault. °1' This result brings the mu-
nicipal liability standard closer to vicarious liability than to
lation); Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362 (1976) (policy must be "moving force" behind
deprivation). See also supra note 51. City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. at
260-72. The dissent in this case discussed thoroughly the importance of a causal con-
nection between the municipal policy, here the police training program, and the consti-
tutional violation. The dissent stated that the language and the history of § 1983
require that the municipality is only liable for its own constitutional violations. Id. at
268. The government's policy or custom must actually inflict the constitutional injury.
Id.
97. 480 U.S. at 268. These additional factors represent intervening causes that
break the causal connection. If there is no causal connection, there is no liability. See
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 45, at 301. ("An intervening cause is one which
comes into active operation in producing the result after the negligence of the defend-
ant.") (emphasis in original).
98. 480 U.S. at 268.
99. Id.
100. See Monell v. New York Dep't Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also 480
U.S. at 269 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("A jury should be permitted to find that the
municipality's inadequate training caused the plaintiff's injury only if the inadequacy of
the training amounts to deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the conse-
quences. Negligence in training alone is not sufficient to satisfy the causation require-
ment of section 1983.").
101. The Tuttle standard requires considerably more proof than a single incident.
To meet this standard the court of appeals needs more than just inferences and conjec-
ture to hold the municipality liable. If inferences such as those made by the First Cir-
cuit in Kibbe satisfy the causation element, then practically any negligent or near
negligent act may result in a § 1983 suit. See 480 U.S. at 270 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(the plurality opinion in Tuttle held that to establish municipal liability for a policy that
is not itself unconstitutional, the plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to establish
the existence of a policy; evidence proving the city's fault in its establishment of the
policy; and evidence establishing the policy as the moving force in causing the constitu-
tional harm).
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causation.102
Kibbe constitutes a major setback in municipal liability cases. The
court's use of inferences and conjecture to establish the causation ele-
ment10 3 needed in section 1983 suits exposes all negligent acts by police
officers to possible violations of section 1983. This holding is contrary
to established standards.1" A municipality should only be held liable
for the acts of its police officers if the plaintiff proves that the munici-
pality maintained a policy of inadequate training or supervision.
Alan R. Korn
102. See supra note 45. See also Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 691
("A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.") (empha-
sis in original). But see generally Mead, supra note 36 (examines the rejection of respon-
deat superior and claims the Court erred in rejecting that concept in favor of the policy
or custom causation requirement).
103. The text of Kibbe lists the inferences made by the court to establish liability.
777 F.2d at 807.
104. See, e.g., Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362 (1976).
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